The Sultanate of Delhi, properly so called, dates from the reign of Shams al-Din Iltutmish (A.D. 1211-36). When the last great Ghurid ruler Muizz al-Din Muhammad b. Sam was murdered in 1206 and his empire began to disintegrate, it was at Lahore—traditionally the administrative centre of the Indian provinces under both the Ghaznavid and the Ghurid dynasties—that his Turkish slave lieutenant Aybeg assumed the canopy of state; and there too that he died four years later. For Fakhr-i Mudabbir, who wrote during Aybeg's reign, Lahore was still the capital of Muslim India; and only through the action of Iltutmish, Aybeg's governor at Budaun, who seized power in a coup at Delhi following his master's death, did this freshly conquered Hindu city become a Muslim capital. That it remained so was due to a combination of circumstances. Firstly, several years elapsed before Iltutmish was able definitively to occupy Lahore and the western Punjab. And secondly, his annexation of Bengal in 1230-1 secured him the status of Islam's sole protagonist in the subcontinent, the ruler of an empire which both extended much further to the east than that of Aybeg or the Ghurids and also was facing a considerably greater threat on its north-west flank. In view of the growing pressure of the Mongols beyond the Indus, the ideal centre of the infant Indo-Muslim polity was not Lahore but Delhi; a circumstance incidentally emphasised by the Mongols themselves when they took and sacked Lahore in 1241. This was their first attack on the territory of the Sultanate itself. Thereafter they are known to have invaded the Punjab and on occasions even Hindustan, in 1245-6, 1257-8, 1285, 1287, 1292, 1297-8, 1299-300, 1303, 1305, c. 1306, c. 1322 and c. 1329. Mongol pressure contributed in a more positive fashion, however, to Delhi's primacy. The city fast became the natural refuge for those in Khurasan and Central Asia—whether bureaucrats, soldiers, scholars, or mystics—who fled from the Mongol terror; and Iltutmish, at least, followed a policy of actively encouraging them to settle in his capital. Delhi's growth during the thirteenth century is largely attributable to this influx, which was swollen, after the outbreak of civil war within the Mongol empire around 1261, by groups of Mongol fugitives also. By the 1290s Delhi's suburbs sprawled along the banks of the Yamuna, where the quarters of Indrapat, Kilokhri (attested as early as 1237 and described in 1260 as 'the new town'), Ghiyathpur and Talika were at this time receiving a further body of Mongol settlers who had entered the service of Sultan Jalal al-Din Khali?.

We possess no statistics for the population of Delhi in the Middle Ages, and the details that have come down to us are all derived from foreign observers of the fourteenth century. The Moroccan Ibn Battuta, who resided in the city for much of the period 1333-42, has left us his testimony as to its vast extent and population. Roughly contemporaneous were the informants of the Egyptian encyclopaedist al-Umari (d. 1349), who credits Delhi with a circumference of forty miles. It contained, he was told, seventy hospitals and a thousand madrasas; though the latter figure is surely exaggerated, and more reliance may be placed on the number sixty or seventy furnished by another Egyptian contemporary, al-Mufaddal. Delhi clearly struck the imagination of all its visitors; and it is not surprising that the Indian historian Barani (wrote c. 1357), who regretfully lacks the precision of these external observers, equates it with Cairo and Baghdad. By this time, moreover, a century of Mongol invasions had thrown into relief the city's function of being not simply an administrative capital and a commercial metropolis, but a vast armed camp. The origins of this development are to be found during the reign of Sultan Alä al-Din Khali (1296-1316).

The first Mongol invasions of the Sultanate's territory had not penetrated further than the western Punjab, where by the reign of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Balban (1266-86) the frontier appears to have lain along the river Bêas. The Mongol raids of Balban's era were the work of an independent grouping known as the Negideris or Qaraunas, based locally in what is now Afghanistan. Towards the end of the century, however, they were brought under the control of the great Central Asian Khanate headed by Qaidu and Dua, resulting in a sudden increase in Mongol striking power.
Delhi through the Ages

From Alā al-Dīn’s reign, the entire Doāb, and even territory beyond the Ganga, lay within range of the Mongols’ depredations. In 1299–1300 Dua’s son Qutlug Qoña invaded India and moved directly on Delhi, abandoning the usual practice of ravaging the country en route, and advancing by forced marches in order to gain the maximum advantage from a surprise blow. He was checked only at Kili, a locality which is now unknown but which appears to have lain not far south of Sāmāna. The Mongol prince died on the return march, but in 1303 his lieutenant Taraghāi advanced to the very outskirts of Delhi and subjected the city to a two-month investment. A subsequent inroad by two Mongol generals Ali Beg and Tartaq in 1305 avoided the capital itself, but ravaged large tracts to the north and east, including Budaon and Avadh, and was defeated in the vicinity of Amroha. After this, there appear to have been no major invasions until the time of Sultan Muhammad b. Tughluq (1325–51), when the Central Asian ruler Tarnāshīrīn, a young son and successor of Dua, swept across the Doāb and devastated the territory at least as far as Mirath (Meerut). Barani attributes the respite gained after about 1306 to the efficacy of Alā al-Dīn’s military and administrative reorganization, when in fact the Mongols’ own internal dissensions must have been at least equally responsible, just as they were again to prevent further invasions after that of Tarnashirīn for the remainder of Muhammad b. Tughluq’s reign. The importance of Alā al-Dīn’s measures for us lies elsewhere, in their contribution to the increasingly militaristic character of the Sultanate and more particularly in their effect upon the status of Delhi.

The manpower of India had long been proverbial throughout Western Asia, and the Delhi Sultans inherited the aggregate capacity of a number of major Hindu potentates to put enormous armies into the field. When the envoys of the Mongol prince Hūlegū visited Delhi in 1260, Ulugh Khān—the future Sultan Balban—took pains to awe them by staging a review of some 200,000 foot and 50,000 horse. How far these representatives principally the entire forces stationed in and around the capital, and to what extent Balban had been obliged to draw on levies from the qalas, we cannot say: Jūzjānī describes the troops as being brought both ‘from the provinces and from about the vicinity of the court’ (az ʿarāf wa hawālī-yī ḥadraw-i alû). Subsequently, Balban was able to review an army of 200,000 men at Avadh, on his way to crush a revolt in Bengal. Alā al-Dīn’s reign appears to have witnessed a considerable increase in the military establishment. Iranian sources at the beginning of the fourteenth century report that his forces stood at more than 500,000, while two decades later the current size of the Delhi army is given as 475,000. Under Muhammad b. Tughluq, who is alleged to have built up an unprecedentedly large force within a very short space for his so-called Khurāsān project, the figures which reached the West are even more impressive. Iranian authors supply no details of the Sultanate’s military establishment for this period, and we are dependent on Arab writers who clearly benefited from the opening up of diplomatic relations between Egypt and India around 1330.

Umārī was told that Muhammad’s troops in the capital and the provinces totalled 900,000. The slightly later author al-Šafādī (d. 1363), however, who reproduces this figure on the authority of an official envoy from Muhammad to the Mamlūk Sultan al-Nāṣir, is sceptical, adding that the true number is reputed to be nearer 600,000. The figure of forty lakhs (four million) for the infantry given, finally, by Muftadī is doubtless due to a confusion of units and should doubtless be 400,000: his 300,000 for the horsemen would then produce a total of 700,000, which harmonizes more closely with the testimony of other sources. In these circumstances, Barani’s details concerning the force of 470,000 destined for the Khurāsān project clearly apply to a specially raised contingent which was distinct from the provincial levies: such a temporary increase may well account for the extraordinarily high figure of 900,000 which Šafādī rejected.

The priority given to the maintenance of such vast armies entailed certain consequences. If the troops were to be paid regularly, the Sultan required a considerable revenue; and furthermore they had to be kept occupied and in training. One way in which the latter aim was accomplished was through hunting expeditions in which large army detachments participated, a practice which may even have been inspired by the Mongol example. But the most effective means whereby these enormous armies could be both raised and kept active was undoubtedly regular campaigning against the Hindus. The Mongol threat appears in some sense to have reversed the order of priorities within the framework of military policy. In its early years the Sultanate’s chief task had been one of maintaining the offensive against the infidel powers of the subcontinent, but as far back as 1247 Jūzjānī portrays Ulugh Khān Balban as advocating a policy of raiding Hindu territory not merely in order to chastise the idolator but to amass booty which could then be used to maintain a defensive army.
in the face of Mongol attacks from the north. The fact that Jûrjânî wrote as a contemporary, and still more his proximity to Balban, make it very likely that these words indicate the adoption of a conscious policy on the part of Delhi’s rulers following the intensification of Mongol pressure after 1240. The passage contrasts sharply with the more simplistic statement of Barânî, who represents Balban, when Sultan, as refusing to launch campaigns against the Hindus as long as the Mongol menace persisted. And we have good reason to distrust him again when he describes how Taraghê’s great invasion of 1303 induced Alâ al-Dîn to give up ‘campaigning and taking war-roads’ (laştîkî-kaştîwâ ḥijar-∂îr). On Barânî’s own admission, this was simply not the case. Even were we to disregard the expeditions which Alâ al-Dîn personally led against Sevànî (1308) and Jîlîr (c. 1311), and to which Barânî makes only the briefest reference, the notice he gives of Malik Kâfûr’s campaign in the south would alone demonstrate that the above statement is worthless. A certain amount of successful—and lucrative—military activity against the independent Hindu states, far from being a drain on the Sultanate’s resources and an irrelevant distraction to its rulers, was a vital factor in his strategy for survival. The real problems arose only when plundering campaigns were abandoned in favour of outright annexation, a development which was accelerated from 1318. Launching regular attacks upon enemy territory in order largely to finance a sizeable standing army for defence elsewhere was one matter; it was quite another to maintain garrisons and a civil administration in a conquered province, with all the additional expense involved. Newly acquired provinces, moreover, could not be treated in the same rapacious manner that characterizes warfare in enemy country. With the imposition of direct rule over vast new regions in the south, therefore, the Delhi Sultans effectively suffered a loss which was twofold. In all likelihood, it was to be one of the factors underlying the economic difficulties of Muhammad b. Tughluq’s reign.

The mere accumulation of vast stocks of specie in the Sultan’s treasury, however, was in itself insufficient. Like any other large city, Delhi suffered periodically from famine brought on by crop failure in its hinterland, on which it was increasingly dependent. Balban at least had laid up stores of rice and millet in the capital in order to meet such emergencies, but in a real crisis they can scarcely have proved adequate. Significantly, prior to Timûr’s invasion in 1398 the Mongol attack which came nearest to success was that of Taraghê, who secured the Yamuna crossings and so cut the city’s supply lines. Muhammad b. Tughluq was to profit from this lesson to maintain communications with the eastern provinces through Tirmâghânân’s establishment by his headquarters at Indrapat. But even at times of comparative peace, a large standing army—particularly when a significant proportion of it was quartered in the capital and its environs—necessitated regular supplies of foodstuffs and clothing materials at low prices. Alâ al-Dîn, again, is the first monarch known to have enacted economic measures specifically for the sake of the military establishment. The entire Dôb region, together with the provinces of Amrêbâ and Kâbar immediately east of the Ganga, was resummed from the existing grantees and brought into the category of state land (khalîsa), and the whole of the revenue demand (maḥyûl) earmarked for the upkeep of the troops and of the state industries (karrkhanâbâ). The kharâj of the Dôb was to be paid, moreover, in grain rather than in cash as previously, and Barânî tells us at another point that the level was fixed at half the produce—in other words, at the maximum allowed according to the Hânifite school. We cannot discount the possibility that the Sultan’s vigorous campaign against the manufacture and consumption of wine and drugs, the success of which would entail a loss of revenue, was in part designed to encourage concentration within the agrarian sector on cereal production. However this may be, Alâ al-Dîn appears, by dint of increasing the capacity of the state granaries and of giving Delhi a virtual monopoly on the purchase of vital commodities other than grain, to have ensured low prices for the capital, and hence for the army, during the remainder of his reign.

One of the effects of Alâ al-Dîn’s policies had been to reduce, to a large extent, the power of intermediaries between the central government and the cultivators. But his policies were abandoned under his immediate successors. His son Quth-ul-Dîn Mubârak Khaljî (1316–20) reduced the kharâj, allowed prices to rise once more, and was obliged in consequence to increase the pay of the troops, while in addition some of the lands resumed under Alâ al-Dîn were again alienated. And although Ghîyâth-ul-Dîn Tughluq (1320–25) instituted inquiries into certain of these grants, his reign appears on balance to have witnessed concessions to the nobility and a corresponding curtailment of royal power in relation to the peasants. It is against the background of these two developments—a contraction in the state’s resources and an erosion of its effective control over what
remained—that we must view the economic measures of Muhammad b. Tughluq, who was obliged to interfere with the existing land-revenue system in the Dūb in order to support the rapid expansion of his military establishment.

The exact proportions of the increase in the demand are obscure. Barani’s vague phraseology, suggesting either a five to ten per cent increase or one of ten- to twenty-fold, was dismissed by Moreland as a mere rhetorical device. It certainly, any increase in the kharaj, following so soon on Tamarqhirin’s devastation of the province, would have provoked severe discontent, even had the level of taxation been less harsh than the fifty per cent demanded under Alā al-Din. But there are two points worth noticing. Firstly, Barani’s earlier recension (which is even vaguer, incidentally, regarding the size of the increase) demonstrates that what the Dūb cultivators found particularly irksome was that they were being asked to pay at least a part of the new assessment in cash (rather than the whole in kind as under Alā al-Din). And secondly, his phrasing elsewhere suggests that we are here dealing with an increase not only in the kharaj but also in the jizya, which had now evidently ceased to be a simple poll-tax and was assessed on income. Possibly these two circumstances help to account for the violent reaction of the Dūb’s inhabitants; but we cannot be certain. If, however, the nature of the new requisitions has caused confusion, greater still has been that surrounding the context of the increase. Only Moreland attempted to place the Dūb assessment in the context of Muhammad’s other measures, and his analysis was based on a misunderstanding. In linking it—correctly—with the so-called transfer of capital from Delhi to Dūgār (Daulatabad), he assumed that Delhi was left deserted and that consequently there was no market for the extra produce. But this is to be misled by the hyperbole of Isāmī and, in places, of Barani. Let us examine the Daulatabad project.

The old city of Delhi had been repeatedly abandoned by different Sultans, beginning with Muizz al-Din Kaqqud (1286–90), who built a new palace at Kīlūkhri on the Yamuna and thereby provoked an exodus by the granaries in turn. Kīlūkhri remained the capital during the early years of the Khish dynasty, since the new regime was viewed with considerable hostility in the old city; and in fact there is no evidence that the seat of government was restored to Delhi until Alā al-Din’s accession. Delhi’s exposed position was highlighted in the course of Taraghri’s invasion, and Alā al-Din subsequently moved his residence to Siri, to the north-east, which had served as his headquarters during both the recent campaign and Qutbuddin Agha’s earlier attack. Here he began the construction of a new fortress, which was to be completed only in the reign of Qub al-Din, while at the same time the dilapidated walls of old Delhi were restored. A third fortified residence, Tughluqabad, situated four or five miles to the east and named after its founder Ghiyāth al-Dīn, ceased to be the capital following the accession of Muhammad, who temporarily moved back into the old city; though we shortly find him storing at Tughluqabad at least a part of his treasury. Muhammad himself set about further building, adding a smaller fortress, Adilabad, to Tughluqabad and linking old Delhi to Siri in 1327 by means of walls which enclosed an area known henceforward as Jahān-panāh. It is clear from Ibn Battūth’s narrative that he often of his predecessors Muhammad resided in the palace of Hazār Surūn, which had been built by Alā al-Din outside the Siri fortress and lay within this new settlement. According to the same author, Muhammad had intended at one point to surround all four ‘cities’ (that is, old Delhi, Siri, Jahān-panāh, and Tughluqabad) with one enormous wall, but was compelled to relinquish the idea in view of the expense involved.

This extensive building programme hardly supports the view that the Delhi conurbation was virtually abandoned in favour of Daulatabad early in Muhammad’s reign. We should note at this juncture that ‘Delhi’ was a term applied equally to the original city wrested from its Hindu rulers in the twelfth century and to the entire complex of towns that had grown up since, and Barani, at least, distinguishes on occasions between old Delhi (gabar—the city par excellence) and the neighbouring settlements. What actually happened around 1327 was that the principal Muslim residents of the old city, together with their dependants and their considerable households, were despatched south. The exception was the military personnel. Barani states clearly that ‘the amirs, maliks and troops’ remained with the Sultan in the north when their families were in Daulatabad, and Isāmī’s bitter allusions to the repopulation of the capital with Hindus surely refer in part to the drafting of peasants for the Khurashān expedition. The old city, therefore, was not deserted, precisely because it was in the process of becoming a vast barracks. This provides a strong indication of the essential coherence of Muhammad’s policy. The two projects—the recruitment of the Khurashān force and the emigration to Daulatabad—had to coincide in order to minimise the increase in
consumption in Delhi and the setting of impossible targets for the grain-producers. Nor does it appear that the Sultan had totally miscalculated. It is significant that Barani attributes the disbandment of the Khurāsān force after one year not to a shortage of supplies but to a lack of sufficient funds to pay its wages.82

Muhammad’s error lay in demanding excessive cash amounts from the Dōðā cultivators, over and above their grain contributions. It is possible that he was driven to this expedient by monetary fluctuations about which we are all too imperfectly informed. His introduction of a so-called token currency (in reality, simply low denomination coins) has been seen as a response to a chronic silver shortage.83 Certainly the flow of silver to Delhi would be greatly reduced after the loss of Bengal around 1335–6;84 but at this earlier juncture the treasury may have been suffering more from a decrease in the value of its gold reserves, since it appears that the price of gold was falling. An Iranian author writing in 1339–40 tells us that as a result of Muhammad’s heavy expenditure (and, by implication, the release of large quantities of gold into the Indian economy) it was no longer profitable to export gold from Iran to India, and the direction of this traffic was now reversed.85 At any rate, the new copper and bronze coins, which Barani at one point explicitly connects with the enlistment of the Khurāsān army,86 came to be rejected by the public, in all likelihood because of the great number of counterfeit coins that were soon in circulation,87 and the scheme was discarded. It may have been in part this same desire for specie which prompted the Sultan to launch the ill-fated Quraqqlīg expedition around 1332–3.88 But Barani’s frequent statements that the treasury was emptied as a result of Muhammad’s policies should be treated with caution. Had this been the case, the government would have been in no position to redeem the ‘token’ coins89 (although it possibly did so at a discount); still less would Muhammad have advanced huge sums, at a time when his revenues were drastically curtailed by the rebellions in Bengal and the south, to the peasants for the purposes of restoring cultivation.90

By 1335–6 the Daulatabād project in turn had been abandoned: not because it was intrinsically unworkable, but because the original motives behind the emigration were now redundant. That one of these motives had been simply to cream off a part of Delhi’s enormous population is hinted in at least one source.91 But the choice of Daulatabād had been dictated by geographical considerations. The city not only lay within the newly annexed territories in the south;
Delhi through the Ages

27. Ibid., p. 340. Cf. also the views retailed to Mufaḍḍal later; Kortantamer, text p. 29 (jannada Iyānīd wa-a Thakīr), tr. p. 109.
29. Waṣṣāf, p. 528 (in the portion of his work completed c. 727/1327): the figure is ultimately produced by Fīrūz (I, pp. 199–200), in the context of Alā al-Dīn’s reforms, but the intermediate authority is difficult to identify. In Barani, pp. 476–7. On the Khurṣīd project, see now Jackson, CAJ, XIX, pp. 128 ff.
32. Kortantamer, text p. 27, tr. p. 104 (though the number of horse is extraordinarily high).
33. The figure given in the earlier recension: Bodleian MS, f 201; MS in private collection of Simon Digby, P 167*. In the standard version (Barani, p. 477) it is reduced to 370,000. I am most grateful to Mr Digby for lending me a photocopy of his MS and for allowing me to consult the original.
34. S. Digby, War-horse and Elephant in the Delhi Sultanate: A Study of Military Supplies (Oxford–Karakchi, 1971), p. 24 & n. 41a, compares Barani’s figure with those given for Alā al-Dīn’s reign, which make it appear far less remarkable. But the evidence of other sources suggests that this was a special army, falling well short of the total numbers under arms in Muhammad’s empire: see Fīrūz, I, p. 240.
35. Cf. Barani, Fāṣūsya-ye Jahāndīr, I. O. MS 1149, f 73*, for the importance attached to this.
36. See Barani, p. 35; Spies, text p. 19, tr. p. 44 (hunting expeditions involving 100,000 troops in Muhammad b. Tughluq’s reign): Aflī, Targīb-i Firuz-šahī, ed. M. V. Hussain (Calcutta, 1888–91. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 321 (for a large tract in Rohlhind reserved for the chase under Firuz Shāhī). In all probability, the expedition to the Baran region around 1333 by Muhammad, which has been defined as a ‘manhunt’ by certain secondary authorities, following Barani’s account (pp. 479–80) was really the same sort of manoeuvre.
40. Ibid., p. 323: later (pp. 325–6) he qualifies this by asserting that Alā al-Dīn resumed his more adventurous policy when the construction work at Siri (see below) was finished; though it is clear that Siri was completed only under his son Qutb al-Dīn.
41. Ibid., p. 333, where they are mentioned for the first time, in connection with their assignments to wāli and wujūf. For the Sevāna and Jālīr campaigns, see Lal, pp. 115–19.
Delhi through the Ages

43. See P. Harday, 'Dhil Sultanate', Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden–London, 1954), II, p. 269. The annexation of Dègöt (1318) and of Tillang and Mabar (c. 1322) and the reconquest of Bengal (c. 1324) meant that the Sultanate came to embrace the greater part of the subcontinent within an extremely short period. It is to this process of expansion that Barani (pp. 468–9) is referring when he describes the unprecedented scope and efficiency of the revenue system during the early years of Muhammad bin Tughluq.

44. The dangers were obvious even to Barani, who saw the absorption of fresh territories as leading to the loss of older provinces (pp. 471, 472); though he also blames the Sultan’s allegedly chimerical projects such as the Khurkhān enterprise (p. 471).

45. See, for example, ibid., p. 212; Iṣṭāmt, pp. 217 ff. (tr. Husain, II, pp. 383 ff.).


47. Barani, pp. 300–1, 302: this further prevented Delhi acquiring reinforcements from the eastern provinces.

48. Bihārīnāshī, P. 400.


53. Although Barani claims that it was intended simply to reduce the incidence of convivial gatherings that might lead to conspiracy and rebellion. According to Sir George Watt, A Dictionary of the Economic Produce of India (London–Calcutta, 1889–93, 6 vols. in 9), VI, p. 273, ‘the grapes of the N. W. provinces and Avadh are hardly suitable for the manufacture of wine’, and Ibn Bāṣṭār, III, p. 129 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 610) confirms that the grape was rare in India in his time, though found in the Delhi region and one other province whose name is blank in all the MSS. Nevertheless, we do find indications in other sources that wine production was prominent in Avadh and in Kīl and Mīrāth, all regions which were the object of Allāl-Dīn’s economic measures; see Barani, pp. 157; M. W. Mirzā, The Life and Works of Amir Khusrav (Calcutta, 1935), p. 72.


55. Ibid., p. 382 for the troops’ pay; p. 383 for the reduction in the kharāj; pp. 384–5 for the rise in prices.

56. Ibid., pp. 382–3.

57. Ibid., p. 439.

58. Ibid., pp. 431–2, for the revenues conceded to the mughals and wāli over and above their stipends (masūḏā); and cf. the more general observations at pp. 428–9.

Moreland, p. 48 n.1. The phrase used by Barani (p. 473), yakti bi-dāsh wa yakti bi-bān, does not occur in his first recension (see below), but it is interestingly echoed in his Fathūwa-yi Fāhrūk, I, 1924, where we read of an increased revenue-demand of yakti bi-panj wa yakti bi-dāsh levied on the cultivators by an apocalyptic tyrant Yazdagird for the purpose of raising an enormous army. Yazdagird in fact bears a marked resemblance to Muhammad bin Tughluq.

59. Iṣṭāmt, p. 113, is the first author to refer explicitly to its effect upon the province.

60. Bediuran MS, I 192; MS Digby Coll., P. 161.

61. See Barani, p. 574 (under the reign of Fīrūz Shāh); also Fathūwa, loc. cit., where the revenue-demand is defined as jīzā wa kharāj. Barani’s usage puzzled Moreland (p. 231 n.1), but that an illegal jīzā was assessed on property (jīzā-yi sayyād) had existed prior to Fīrūz Shāh’s reforms as is confirmed by that monarch in his Fathūwa-yi Fīrūz-Shāhī, ed. Shahid Abdur Rashīd (Aligarh, 1954), p. 5 (with sanbāl in error).


63. Barani, p. 130.

64. Ibid., pp. 173, 175 ff.

65. Barani’s references to ‘Delhi’ during his coverage of Jaal al-Dīn’s reign seem to refer to the general conurbation rather than to the old city; cf. pp. 187, 212, 228, where the Sultan is based at Khākhri.


68. Khāzān, pp. 27–8; also Barani, p. 302. The content for this fortification later included the blood of Mongols captured during Köpek’s invasion around 1306 (Khāzān, pp. 27–8).

69. Khāzān, pp. 456–7; this was overlooked by Hilary Waddington, ‘Aḍālībād: A Part of the ‘Fourth’ Delhi’, Ancient India, I (1946), p. 62 n.9, who assumed that the capital ‘deserted’ under Muhammad was Tughluqābād.

70. Barani, p. 476; but cf. p. 468, where treasure is mentioned as stored in Hazār Sūtan.


72. Ibn Bāṣṭār, III, pp. 220, 599 (tr. Gibb, III, pp. 660, 746). Husain thinks that the Hazār Sūtan palace was founded by Muhammad: Rise and Fall, I, 119 n.21; Tughluq Dynasty, p. 169 n.3, 172. But this is not actually supported by the authority he quotes, the Qusūl of Badr-i Chishti; see lithograph ed. M. Hādi Ali (Ranpur, n. d.) p. 53. And Barani’s first recension states categorically that it was the work of Allāl-Dīn (MS Digby Coll., P. 114°); in any case, the standard version shows that it had been the later Khālīṣ’s residence (Barani, pp. 284, 396, 403, etc.).

At one point in the text suggesting that Muhammad was residing at the Dār al-Khīlāfāt, i.e. Sīr (p. 466) tr. Husain, III, p. 702; though we know from Umar’s sources that he moved from palace to palace (Spies, text p. 18, tr. p. 44).
Delhi through the Ages

76. E.g., Barani, pp. 448–50.
77. For the date, see Baranī’s first recension, Bodleian MS P. 190°; MS Digby Coll., f° 159v.
78. Barani, p. 473 (khwānsīs bi khalq; marudm-i guzida sa ghide); cf. Rise and Fall, pp. 110 ff.; Tughluq Dynasty, pp. 146 ff.
81. As Muhammad b. Mubārak (Mīr-i Kāhwar), Sād-i al-walāyāt, lithograph ed. (Delhi, 1202/1885), p. 271, implies that they did.
82. Barani, p. 477.
84. According to Yahyā b. Ahmad, Qadr K̲h̲ān, the governor of Bengal, was amassing great quantities of coined silver to send to Delhi at the time of the province’s revolt: Tārīkh-i Mubārak-shāhī, p. 104 (his date 739/1339–9) is incorrect: both Iṣāmī, p. 472, tr. Husain, III, p. 709, and Barani, p. 480, imply that the rebellion occurred around the time of the secession of Mabar and of Muhammad’s Kanaaj campaign, on which cf. Ibn Batūta, III, p. 144, tr. Gibb, III, p. 617. On the plentiful silver coinage of Bengal during the period of its independence, see Digby, War-horse and Elephant, p. 44 n. 121.
86. Barani, p. 475.
88. See Ibn Batūta, III, pp. 325–8 (tr. Gibb, III, pp. 713–14); Jackson, CAJ, XIX, pp. 132 ff. The date is suggested by N. V. Ramanayya, ‘The date of the rebellions of Tilang and Kamplia against Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq’, Indian Culture, V (1938–9), p. 140 n. 1. The ‘token’ coins range from 730 to 732/1329 to 1332 (Nelson Wright, pp. 139–46). Baranī makes it clear that the Qarāğıl force was a part of the army raised for Khurṣān (p. 477).
89. Ibid., p. 476.
90. Ibid., pp. 498–9.
91. Iṣāmī, p. 466 (tr. Husain, III, p. 702): the context is the Qarāğıl campaign, which Iṣāmī depicts as a deliberate ploy by Muhammad to reduce the surplus population.
94. Baranī, p. 481: his edict was issued at the time of setting out for Tilang, i.e. presumably at the outset of the abortive Mabar campaign, in 1334.

Delhi: A Vast Military Encampment

95. Ibn Batūta, III, p. 316 (tr. Gibb, III, p. 708). Husain (Rise and Fall, pp. 121–3; Tughluq Dynasty, pp. 171–3), assumed that this remark was based on hearsay and hence unreliable; but if we accept that it applies only to old Delhi, it does not contradict Ibn Batūta’s other observations.

Abbreviations

B.L. British Library
CAJ Central Asiatic Journal